By Greg C. Reeson

An increasing number of reports coming out of Iraq indicate that the United States and the Maliki government are close to completing an agreement for the continued presence of U.S. forces. Reuters even reported August 25 that Prime Minister Maliki, in a speech to tribal sheiks in the Green Zone, has said a final agreement has been reached.

Whether an agreement has been finalized or not, the outlines of the proposed pact, together with the caveat statements made by Iraqi officials, that have emerged thus far appear to be an acceptance of President Bush’s demand for a conditions-based withdrawal of U.S. forces.

According to leaked details, the draft security agreement calls for U.S. combat troops to leave Iraqi cities and villages by June 30 of next year. It further calls for a departure of all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011. Sticking points that are in the fine tuning stages of negotiation include legal immunity for U.S. troops in Iraq and a few other lesser details. But putting talk of specific dates aside, the realities on the ground in Iraq will dictate that the final agreement be conditions-based, and not beholden to a rigid timetable. Here’s why.

First, to state the blatantly obvious, a conditions-based approach provides military commanders the flexibility to respond to long-term trends in the patterns of violence. Knowing they have the ability to reinforce, or reduce, troop levels as needed, military commanders can plan long-term strategies designed to ensure the security necessary for political progress. In short, it just makes good military sense.

Second, while Iraqi security forces continue to grow in both size and capability, they have a long way to go. Sectarian rivalries still exist within the ranks, and both equipment and competency shortfalls still need to be addressed. Even more importantly, Iraqi security forces lack strong officers and noncommissioned officers. Leaders take time to develop, and in the case of Iraq, where leadership positions under Saddam Hussein were awarded based on personal acquaintance and loyalty to Saddam, the United States literally started from scratch. And the Iraqi police, considered vital to the type of local, among-the-people interaction needed to combat an insurgency, are in even more need of assistance than the Iraqi Army. The training effort is ongoing, and progress is being made. To abandon the army and police forces before they are ready to provide security for the country is to doom Iraq to failed state status.

Third, elections scheduled for later this year, or more likely for early next year, will put recent political accommodations to the test. U.S. and Iraqi forces have prepared for elections in the past by increasing the number of available troops to help head off increased levels of violence that often accompany struggles for power in developing states. Both U.S. and Iraqi leaders need to have the means at their disposal, in other words the ability to deploy security forces, to meet the challenges that will surely arise as a result of the elections. A fixed withdrawal timeline makes this impossible.

Fourth, al Qaeda in Iraq is down, but not out. Changes at the tactical level that accompanied the surge of U.S. forces last year increased pressure on al Qaeda elements in Iraq and rooted them out of the vast majority of their strongholds. Many have been killed, and others have fled to Afghanistan to join the fight against the NATO coalition. But some hardcore elements remain in Iraq and their ability to conduct large-scale bombings that produce mass casualties still pose a grave threat to the Iraqi government. As the threat level continues to decline, military commanders can make assessments and recommendations on troop levels to the President. But a premature easing of the pressure being applied to al Qaeda in Iraq could give the group new life.

Finally, Muqtada al-Sadr’s intentions remain unclear. Sadr recently reorganized his Mahdi Army into a cultural wing to foster ties with the Iraqi people and an armed wing to continue the fight against U.S.-led forces. Sadr has been losing ground in Iraq in the wake of continuing offensives by U.S. and Iraqi forces, and he appears to be attempting to figure out a way to stay relevant. He is very popular among Iraq’s Shi’a, largely due to a social services network modeled after Hezbollah’s in Lebanon. But his continued absence from Iraq, ostensibly for religious studies in Iran, weakens his position and threatens his movement. The continued presence of U.S. forces, based on regular assessments of the security situation, allows the government of Iraq to continue to increase its capacity to deal with threats like al Sadr. As that capacity grows, the need for U.S. forces will diminish.

None of this is new, even for the most casual of Iraq observers. But the fact remains that there are valid reasons for determining U.S. troop levels based on conditions, and not on time. Iraqi leaders know this, and their caveats when talking about timetables demonstrate their understanding of the realities on the ground.

On August 22, The New York Times quoted Mohammad Hamoud, Iraq’s chief negotiator, as saying the draft security pact contained provisions that allowed the “timetable” to be adjusted based on the security situation. The Times also quoted another senior Iraqi official as saying the dates in the pact were “prospective,” and dependent on the ability of Iraqi forces to provide security.

In another article last week, The Los Angeles Times quoted Ali Dabbagh, an Iraqi government spokesman, as saying the dates in the proposed security agreement were “hypothetical,” and that ultimately Iraqi national security interests would dictate the pace of any U.S. withdrawal.

What’s happening right now is that Iraqi leaders are tailoring their public statements in response to domestic political pressures while privately expressing a realistic understanding of the challenges they still face. Even Prime Minister Maliki, who has of late been stepping up his timetable rhetoric, has generally included caveats in his statements that include phrases like “conditions permitting,” and “if conditions hold.”

There’s nothing wrong with articulating goals, or “time horizons,” or “aspirations.” The Iraqi people don’t want to be dependent on U.S. troops, and the United States needs to relieve some of the stress on its ground forces and free up assets for other global crises that will undoubtedly arise.

But officials in both Iraq and the United States recognize what is at stake. And that’s why a conditions-based approach to U.S. troop withdrawals will ultimately prevail, even if it contains adjustable dates.

By Greg C. Reeson

Late in the day on August 7, Georgian military forces entered the breakaway republic of South Ossetia in Georgia’s north central region in an effort to reclaim control of the hotly contested province. Less than 48 hours later, Russian troops entered the fray, ostensibly to protect Russian peacekeepers and Russian citizens in South Ossetia, advancing to a point less than 50 miles from the Georgian capital of Tbilisi. In the wake of a French-brokered cease-fire, Russia’s true motives have become increasingly clear.

Russian motivations for intervening in Georgia on behalf of South Ossetia can be summarized as follows. First, Russia was anxious to counter U.S. influence in the Caucasus, having watched for years as Georgia and the United States increased diplomatic, economic, and military cooperation, and as the Georgian government pushed for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Georgia under Mikhail Saakashvili, prodded and supported by the United States, has been taunting Russia for a very long time. Moscow finally decided it was time to act, using South Ossetia as a means for pushing back against U.S.-led western encroachment.

Second, Russia wanted to send a clear message not only to the nations of the Caucasus region, but to all states that once comprised the former Soviet Union. Make no mistake about it, the audience targeted by Moscow included Ukraine, which has, like Georgia, been distancing itself from Russia while fostering closer ties with the United States, and Poland and the Czech Republic, former Soviet satellite states now serving as hosts for U.S. ballistic missile defense systems. The message: cooperation with the west can be dangerous, and may not be tolerated.

Finally, Russia wanted to show the world that it was well on its way to a full recovery from the dismal times that had followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. While Moscow understood that it had not regained its former superpower status, it was intent on demonstrating that it was capable of asserting itself as a regional power, with the means and the will to impose its wishes on neighboring countries if it felt the need to do so.

Some have speculated that Russia’s support of South Ossetia was in part payback for western support of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia. I find that argument a little hard to swallow. It is true that Russia had expressed its opposition to Kosovo’s independence, and had warned of the potential consequences of western support for the redrawing of borders in the Balkans. But to suggest that Russia was willing to use armed intervention to support the independence of a breakaway province on its periphery is a bit of a stretch. Rather, it is more probable that larger, more complex issues, like those cited above, were instrumental in Russia’s decision to go to war with Georgia.

So, what did Russia accomplish with its intervention in South Ossetia and its invasion of Georgia proper? Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR), a private geopolitical intelligence firm based in Austin, recently argued that Russia had demonstrated three things with its Georgian expedition. The first was that the Russian military was capable of mounting a successful operation. This was important for Russia, for many in the west had discounted the ability of the Russian military to undertake meaningful offensive action given the degradation in equipment and resources that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The success of Russian forces in South Ossetia and Georgia, Russia’s first offensive action since the fall of the Soviet empire, made it clear that Russia has regained some of its former military capability and is once again capable of operating militarily in its border regions.

Second, STRATFOR says, the Russians demonstrated that they could defeat a U.S.-trained military force. I would argue that the jury is jury is still out on this one, and the verdict is far from being assured. The United States has been providing military assistance and training to Georgia for years, but that assistance and training has been focused on two tasks: counterterrorism activities and Iraq. Neither of those tasks is suited for the type of war launched by the Russians. Given the immediacy of the terrorist threat in nearby Chechnya and the ongoing conflict in Iraq, U.S. trainers were not preparing Georgian soldiers to conduct traditional force-on-force combat operations against Russian invaders.

Third on STRATFOR’s list was that Russia had demonstrated the United States and NATO were in no position to intervene militarily. This comes as a surprise to no one. With U.S. troops committed to two active theaters of combat, Afghanistan and Iraq, there simply are no additional forces available for contingencies that may arise elsewhere in the world. NATO, which has been reluctant to fulfill its promised troop contributions in Afghanistan, could hardly be expected to intervene against the Russians on behalf of a non-NATO member.

About all the United States and Europe can do for Georgia right now is to provide humanitarian assistance and diplomatic rhetoric at the United Nations. Even that is more symbolic than substantive. The Russians control the main east-west road in Georgia and the seaport of Poti, limiting the freedom of maneuver of those providing outside assistance. At the United Nations, Russia holds veto power in the Security Council, making it impossible to even get a U.N. resolution critical of Russia’s actions. The real lesson here is that U.S. and European allies are now feeling vulnerable, unsure whether they could rely on outside assistance in the face of aggression from a resurgent Russia.

Russia still has a long way to go in its attempt to reclaim its former superpower status. But its intervention in Georgia has demonstrated that Russia is once again a power to be reckoned with, and that its wishes, often dismissed out of hand in the years following the end of the Cold War, can no longer be ignored. Russia’s invasion of Georgia was designed to put the west, and the United States in particular, on notice: Russia is back.

The critical factor driving more aggressive operations, rightly noted by Schippert, is the changing situation not in Washington, but in Pakistan.

While Pakistan has never been a consistently reliable partner in the war on terror, the United States has, in general, been able to count on Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to provide at least some level of support to U.S. forces in the form of overflight rights, ground transit of critical war materiel, deployment of Pakistani forces to the border area, etc. However, recent governmental changes within Pakistan make continued cooperation a tenuous prospect, at best.

Opposition victories in parliamentary elections diminished Musharraf's power, and it is highly likely that he is nearing the end of his reign as Pakistan's president. Factions within the parliament are spearheading efforts to "talk" to Islamic militants and to scale back offensive actions in the border region that are designed to put pressure on Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters.

It is becoming increasingly clear that if the United States wants to maintain the offensive on militants in the border region, and inside Pakistan, it is going to have to do it without the help of the Pakistani government. That's why we've seen an increase in cross border attacks by U.S. drones and artillery units, and that's why we've seen a more assertive Afghan government threatening to take action if Pakistan fails to control attacks from its territory (knowing full well that the Afghan government is incapable of undertaking offensive operations in the border region, let alone, inside Pakistani territory, and that any action taken would be with heavy assistance from U.S. forces).

What Bush critics have gotten wrong all along is what motivates the President. Of course he's made mistakes. Show me one president who hasn't. But he consistently takes actions he believes to be in the best interest of the country. No matter what you may think of his beliefs, he sticks to them. Ordering stepped up efforts to capture or kill bin Laden reflects his understanding of the changing geopolitical realities in the region. The day will soon be here when we can no longer count on Pakistani assistance in the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda. It is better to ramp up our military measures now, rather than later when it will likely be much more difficult, and much more costly.

I, for one, firmly believe (and here is where I catch flak from the Bush-haters) that President Bush cares more about winning in Afghanistan and Iraq than he does about his legacy. If the United States emerges victorious from these two critical battlefields, Islamic terrorism will have been dealt a serious blow and history will be kind to President Bush. If, however, we fail in the current fight, our enemies will be emboldened to strike at us again and the legacy of George W. Bush will not matter at all.

By Greg C. Reeson

This past weekend on Fox News Sunday, Brit Hume remarked that the upcoming presidential election had little to do with John McCain and was instead a referendum on the Democratic nominee, Senator Barack Obama. Is the country ready for an African American president? Are Americans searching for something new, having grown tired of the business-as-usual mentality in Washington? Has President Bush so destroyed the Republican Party that no GOP candidate has a legitimate shot at winning this November?

These are all fair questions, but at this point in the contest the answers are purely speculative. What is not speculative is Obama’s plan for America if he is elected to the White House this November. The “Blueprint for Change,” published just prior to the Iowa Caucus, offers a glimpse into where this country is headed if the Senator from Illinois becomes the next President of the United States.

Domestically, Obama’s plan has three primary themes: a massive increase in the size and scope of government; the further redistribution of wealth within American society; and more government control coupled with a corresponding decrease in individual accountability and responsibility. Here are a few examples.

First, let’s look at Obama’s plan for growing the government. Despite his pledge at the beginning of the blueprint “…to put government back in your hands, where it belongs,” an Obama presidency promises substantial and sustained increases in the size and scope of the federal government that will result in more control over the lives of ordinary Americans and more interference with the conduct of private business. Take, for instance, Senator Obama’s support for free television and radio time for political campaigns. For starters, there is no such thing as “free” air time. Private broadcast stations would be forced to accept programming directed by the government (incurring cost in freedom of choice), consumers would be forced to watch or listen to programming directed by the government (incurring cost in freedom of choice), and one can only speculate that the “free” time would be paid for with taxpayer dollars (presumably at a rate not conducive to profit-making for the broadcast stations).

Keeping with the grow-the-government and take control of people’s lives theme, Obama supports the creation of a National Health Insurance Exchange that would “help” individuals purchase private insurance plans. I’m not sure how inserting government into individual choice and private business “helps” anyone, given that government does few things more efficiently than individuals and private sector companies. Under Obama’s plan, insurers would be forced to issue every applicant an insurance policy, with monthly premiums set without regard to the health of the individual. Employers who fail to contribute to their employees’ health care costs will be required to pay money into the national plan. Does anyone believe that these costs will not be passed on to consumers? Again, private companies will be told by the federal government who they will do business with and how that business will be conducted.

On nearly every page of Obama’s blueprint you will find the words “create,” “expand,” “provide capital,” “increase,” “double,” and even “quadruple.” It’s not hard to see that the Blueprint for Change is a recipe for a massive growth of the federal government that will provide national direction in lieu of individual choice.

Senator Obama is also a clear advocate of the further redistribution of wealth within American society. His plan calls for the creation of a new “Making Work Pay” tax credit of up to $500 per person, or $1,000 per working family. According to Obama, the tax credit would wipe out any tax burden at all for 10 million families. Additionally, Obama advocates reversing most of the tax cuts of 2001 and 2003. Given the massive increases in government spending planned in the blueprint, it’s pretty easy to see that Obama will shift the tax burden to those Americans who are able to pay more. The “wealthiest” Americans can expect higher income taxes and higher Social Security taxes, while more of their fellow citizens are taken off the tax rolls altogether. And while the “wealthiest” are not clearly defined in the blueprint, I, as a government employee who makes more than $97,500 (the current salary cap for Social Security taxes) and who benefited from the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts, can expect to see less of my paycheck each month under an Obama administration (never mind that I have four kids and, living in the Washington, D.C. area, am decidedly middle class).

A third defining feature of Senator Obama’s plan is a decrease in individual responsibility, which fits in nicely with the increased control of the federal government over the lives of American citizens. Under the Obama plan, health insurance options for young adults would expand to the point where 25-year old men and women would be allowed to stay on their parents’ health plans. I say men and women because at the age of 25 you should no longer be a child dependent on mommy and daddy. You should be capable of independent thought and able to exercise individual choice, while accepting the responsibility and accountability that go along with free will.

A President Obama would also establish a fund to help Americans refinance their mortgages while providing “…comprehensive support to innocent homeowners.” Call me naïve, but I believe that adults who enter into mortgages are really not all that innocent, and should be held accountable for either not understanding what they were getting themselves into or for accepting risk with adjustable rate mortgages that could increase interest rates beyond their ability to pay. And guess who would be providing the funds to bail these homeowners out? You guessed it: other taxpayers.

Finally, Senator Obama wants to implement a retirement security plan that will force employers to automatically enroll employees in a direct deposit IRA. Of course, an employee can always opt out, but government is still interjecting itself into the workplace and forcing individuals to save for retirement unless they take additional steps to stop the payroll deduction. This retirement security plan implies that Americans are not capable of making retirement savings decisions on their own. Instead, the federal government comes in, absolves them of any personal responsibility (unless, of course, they choose to opt out of the plan), and makes the decisions about what’s best for individual workers.

In the foreign policy realm, Obama’s blueprint clings to an Iraq plan that does not acknowledge the positive trends experienced since President Bush’s surge of additional troops into Anbar Province and Baghdad last year. Senator Obama maintains his call for a steady withdrawal of troops, without regard for the risks to the security gains made since last September, arguing that the best way to pressure Iraqi leaders is to make it clear we are leaving. Of course, this plan in no way takes into consideration the ability of Iraqi security forces. The belief is that if we start to leave, the Iraqi Army and police will suddenly be spurred into action, accepting responsibility for the security of their nation. Whether or not they are actually able to provide their own security is of little importance. I can envision now the sight of the last American troops leaving Baghdad in helicopters from the roof of the American Embassy because Iraqi Security Forces were just not quite ready.

The other major feature of Senator Obama’s foreign policy plan is his willingness to meet with Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Obama blueprint offers nothing new for Iran except the promise of a face-to-face with the American President. Obama’s offer of World Trade Organization membership in exchange for Iranian abandonment of its nuclear program and support for terrorism has already been rejected by Tehran, as has his offer of economic investments. Is the hatred of George W. Bush so strong that we are to believe Khamenei and Ahmadinejad will give up their nuclear pursuits just because a new guy is in the White House? They must be laughing hysterically in Iran.

Mr. Hume was onto something when he said this past weekend that the November presidential election would be a referendum on Barack Obama. It should be about him. But when voters go to the polls to cast their ballots, they should do so not based on whether they think the country is ready for an African American president or out of some lingering hatred for President Bush. They should do so based on whether or not they believe Senator Obama’s Blueprint for Change is the right path for America to take in the years ahead.

After receiving a considerable amount of grief from John McCain and the Republican National Committee, Barack Obama has decided to consider visiting Iraq this summer. The last time Obama traveled to the war zone to meet with our troops was about two years ago. This is an important point, to be sure. It is hard to fathom that a leading contender for the presidency has not made even semi-regular visits to observe first-hand what is generally considered to be the United States’ top foreign policy challenge. But what is most troubling is that Obama appears to be nonchalant about the matter, acting as though knowledge of the realities on the ground in Iraq is just not that important.

I imagine Obama will meet with a tough crowd if he does indeed decide to visit our soldiers and commanders in Iraq. After all, it is doubtful that many will agree with the idea of leaving a job half-finished or making military decisions based on arbitrary dates or troop withdrawal rates (one to two brigades per month according to the Obama plan) without regard for the tactical situation or the potential consequences involved. Of course, it is possible that Obama will have a change of heart if he goes to Iraq with open eyes and an open mind. The last time he was there, sectarian violence was spinning out of control and al Qaeda fighters were unleashing horrific attacks that that threatened to plunge the country into all-out civil war. Since then, however, the situation has become strikingly different. According to the Institute for the Study of War, as of May 2008 the following had occurred:

*Overall attacks dropped more than 50% between December 2006 and December 2007.

*IED explosions dropped from more than 1,500 per month in December 2006 to about 700 per month in December 2007.

*High profile attacks (car bombs, suicide vests, etc.) dropped form about 80 in December 2006 to about 50 in November 2007.

*Indirect fire attacks (rockets, mortars, etc.) dropped from just over 800 in December 2006 to less than 400 in October 2007.

*Attacks in Anbar Province, once considered lost by a Marine intelligence officer, dropped from around 1100 in December 2006 to just over 200 in August 2007.

*Civilian deaths dropped from more than 3,500 in December 2006 to around 700 in February 2008.

*Ethno-sectarian deaths dropped from about 1,600 in December 2006 to about 100 in February 2008.

All of this is good news, of course, but perhaps the most striking statistic is this one: the number of weapons caches found by coalition and Iraqi forces increased from about 80 in December 2006 to more than 200 in February 2008. What’s important about this statistic is that it reflects a population that feels safe and secure enough to provide coalition and Iraqi forces with the intelligence required to find hidden weapons and get them of the streets. Locals don’t come forward with information when they are terrified of being killed by insurgents. They come forward when they have confidence in the ability of security forces to protect them.

What I have learned over the years is that there is no substitute for first-hand knowledge. As a battalion operations officer in Iraq several years ago, I was responsible for the force protection plan for our forward operating base in a nasty little spot between Fallujah and Ramadi. I took my responsibility seriously, and walked the ground around our perimeter, carefully looking at the terrain’s features before deciding on the best locations for our guard towers and fighting positions. When another unit came to take over our FOB, my counterpart laid a map on the table in front of me and pointed out where he intended make changes to the force protection plan. I was confused about his plans and questioned his reasoning. His ideas, it turned out, were based on his assessment of the terrain as indicated on a map of the area. He did not take the time to personally examine the perimeter or the terrain, and his plan reflected his lack of first-hand knowledge.

So, will Obama go to Iraq and then acknowledge, based on first-hand experience that the security situation has indeed gotten better, and that hasty calls for withdrawal without regard to consequences or gains made may be premature? I doubt it. Senator Obama’s own statements are indicative of a man who seemingly does not place much value on first-hand experience and knowledge. While traveling on Wednesday, Obama told reporters, according to the Associated Press, that his lack of visits to Iraq were “not relevant.”

By Greg C. Reeson

Over the past few months, several factors have contributed to what appears to be a renewed focus by the Bush administration on the war in Afghanistan. Of course, the ongoing violence in Iraq is still center stage at the White House, in the Congress, on the campaign trail, and in the minds of American citizens. But there can be little doubt that President Bush is taking steps, with a new sense of urgency, to shift resources and attention to the faltering war against remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

Shifting U.S. attention to Afghanistan at this particular moment makes sense. Trend lines in Iraq indicate a clear reduction in most indicators of violence over the past eight months, while violence levels in Afghanistan are steadily increasing as confident Taliban fighters seek to exert more control and influence outside of traditional strongholds. As troop levels in Iraq continue to decline, more combat power is needed in Afghanistan where NATO member countries have consistently fallen short in providing the necessary resources in personnel, equipment, and, more importantly, combat capability. Finally, an increasingly unstable Pakistan is proving more and more unwilling, or unable, to control Islamist militants within Pakistan and along the border with Afghanistan. Each of these deserves further attention.

A resurgent Taliban has been consistently increasing the number of attacks against coalition forces, the Karzai government, and Afghan civilians. Each year since the U.S.-led invasion in late 2001 has become more deadly than the last, and each year the Taliban has pushed a little farther out of its safe havens, taking control of more and more territory and terrorizing a frightened population that has no confidence in the ability of coalition or government troops to protect it. Al-Qaeda remnants still exist, but they are largely confined to the tribal areas along the border with Pakistan and exercise little, if any, command and control capability. Still, they threaten the future stability of Afghanistan and have to be reckoned with.

NATO has failed to meet U.S. expectations since taking the lead in Afghanistan in 2003. Not only are troop contributions from member countries insufficient for the task at hand, but national caveats and short-term deployments hinder operational effectiveness and the flexibility of commanders to employ troops when and where they are most needed. While most of the combat burden is being borne by the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Canada, other member countries prohibit their forces from serving in dangerous areas or engaging in any form of combat except in cases of self-defense. Additionally, member country tour lengths typically fall far short of the deployment cycles of American units, causing a lack of cohesion and forcing constant re-learning of local terrain and population features. Many NATO countries subscribe to the notion that reconstruction and development will make the Taliban and al-Qaeda irrelevant, but neither is possible without first providing security for the population.

In Pakistan, the ruling government is increasingly fragile as President Pervez Musharraf steadily loses his grip on power and opposition figures struggle with each other for primacy. The assassination of Benazir Bhutto demonstrated the ability of Islamist radicals to move freely within Pakistani society and to cause chaos and fear among the population. The United States is becoming increasingly aggressive in targeting militants on Pakistani soil because the minimal effort previously put forth by Islamabad is quickly fading away. Simply put, Pakistan cannot be relied on to be a consistent and dependable ally in the war on terror.

So what should the United States do to head off a disaster in Afghanistan?

The first step has already been taken. The nomination of General David Petraeus last month to succeed Admiral William Fallon as the commander of CENTCOM, the combatant command responsible for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, was a long overdue recognition that the fight against the Taliban and al-Qaeda is far from over. Petraeus is considered by many in Washington to be America’s leading expert on counterinsurgency, in both theory and in practice. He is credited with successfully turning Iraq away from the disaster that would have accompanied full-scale civil war and his confirmation by the Senate will bring a fresh set of eyes to the Afghan problem.

Second, we have to inject American leadership into the overall effort in Afghanistan. That means increasing American force levels, as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has already alluded to by mentioning the possible deployment of an additional 7,000 U.S. troops next year. The additional combat power mentioned by Gates would bring the total number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to around 40,000. Injecting American leadership also means taking over command of forces battling the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the volatile south, another idea alluded to by Gates. Adding more American troops and taking over the fight in the south would make the overall effort in Afghanistan distinctly American.

Third, the United States should take whatever actions are necessary inside Pakistan to combat militant Islamists hindering our efforts in Afghanistan. Whether the Pakistani government is unwilling or unable to apply pressure to the tribal areas along the Afghan border is irrelevant. What matters is that militants cross the border freely and engage in attacks that kill coalition and government forces and Afghan civilians.

Finally, the United States should continue to put pressure on our NATO allies to remove restrictions on their forces, increase troop levels, and provide more economic and security force training assistance to the government of Hamid Karzai. Of course, this is more easily said than done, but it needs to be said nonetheless. European countries contributing to the fight in Afghanistan are faced with declining public support at home for continuing the war, defense budgets that have been in decline for years, and a significant capability shortfall that makes interoperability with American forces nearly impossible. Everyone recognizes that NATO is failing in Afghanistan, and the alliance is starting to fracture. These problems will not be fixed overnight. But they will also not be fixed without consistent and hard-nosed diplomatic pressure from both the President and the Congress.